

## Treasury Management and Annual Investment Strategy 2019/20

### 1 Introduction

#### 1.1 Treasury management is defined as:

‘The management of the local authority’s borrowing, investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks’.

#### 1.2 The strategy covers:

- Statutory and regulatory requirements
- Balanced budget requirement
- Prudential and treasury Indicators
- Borrowing requirement
- Current treasury position
- Prospects for interest rates
- Investment policy
- Creditworthiness policy
- Country, counterparty and group exposure limits
- Cash flow and core fund investment
- Medium and long term investment
- Year end investment report
- Policy on use of external service providers.

### 2 Statutory and regulatory requirements

2.1 The Local Government Act 2003 (the Act) and supporting regulations requires the Council to ‘have regard to’ the Chartered Institute of Public Finance (CIPFA) Prudential Code and the CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice to set Prudential and Treasury Indicators for the next three years to ensure that the Council’s capital investment plans are affordable, prudent and sustainable.

2.2 The Act requires the Council to set out its Treasury Management Strategy for borrowing and to prepare an Annual Investment Strategy

which sets out the Council's policies for managing its investments and for giving priority to the **security** and **liquidity** of those investments.

- 2.3 The Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) issued revised Statutory Guidance on Local Government Investments (2018 Edition). CIPFA also amended the Prudential Code for Capital Finance in Local Authorities (2017 Edition) and the Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice and Cross Sectorial Guidance Notes (2017 Edition). The MHCLG and CIPFA Codes came into effect on 1<sup>st</sup> April 2018.
- 2.4 Historically the scope of the statutory guidance and CIPFA codes was limited to the investment of an authority's cash surpluses and the management of borrowing undertaken to support its capital expenditure plans. The updated statutory guidance and codes broaden that scope to include expenditure on loans and the acquisition of non-financial assets (property) intended to generate a profit. The Council has not engaged in any commercial investments and has no material non-treasury investments.
- 2.5 The Council formally adopted the revised CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice (2017 Edition) on 30 October 2018. The primary requirements of the Code are as follows:
- Creation and maintenance of a Treasury Management Policy Statement which sets out the policies and objectives of the Council's treasury management activities.
  - Creation and maintenance of Treasury Management Practices which set out the manner in which the Council will seek to achieve those policies and objectives.
  - Receipt by the full Council of an Annual Treasury Management Strategy, including the Annual Investment Strategy, for the year ahead; a mid-year Review Report; and an Annual Report (stewardship report) covering activities during the previous year.
  - Delegation by the Council of responsibilities for implementing and monitoring treasury management policies and practices and for the execution and administration of treasury management decisions.
  - Delegation by the Council of the role of scrutiny of the Treasury Management Strategy and policies to a specific named body. For this Council the delegated body is the Audit Committee.
- 2.6 The scheme of delegation and role of the Section 151 officer that give effect to these requirements are set out at **[Appendix 1]**.

### 3 **Balanced budget requirement**

3.1 It is a statutory requirement under Section 33 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992, for the Council to produce a balanced budget. In particular, Section 32 requires a local authority to calculate its budget requirement for each financial year to include the revenue costs that flow from capital financing decisions. This means that increases in capital expenditure must be limited to a level whereby increases in charges to revenue from:

- increases in interest charges caused by increased borrowing to finance additional capital expenditure, and
- any increases in running costs from new capital projects are limited to a level which is affordable within the projected income of the Council for the foreseeable future.

### 4 **Prudential and treasury indicators**

4.1 It is a statutory duty under Section 3 of the Act and supporting regulations, for the Council to determine and keep under review how much it can afford to borrow. The amount so determined is termed the 'Affordable Borrowing Limit'. In England and Wales the Authorised Limit represents the legislative limit specified in the Act.

4.2 The Council must have regard to the Prudential Code when setting the 'Authorised Limit', which essentially requires it to ensure that total capital investment remains within sustainable limits and, in particular, that the impact upon its future council tax levels is 'acceptable'.

4.3 Whilst termed an 'Affordable Borrowing Limit', the capital plans to be considered for inclusion incorporate financing by both external borrowing and other forms of liability, such as credit arrangements. The 'Authorised Limit' is to be set, on a rolling basis, for the forthcoming financial year and two successive financial years.

4.4 Prudential and Treasury Indicators relevant to setting an integrated treasury management strategy are set out in **[Appendix 2]**.

### 5 **Borrowing requirement**

5.1 Other than for cash flow purposes and then within the limits set out at **[Appendix 2]** borrowing will not be necessary. All capital expenditure in 2019/20 will be funded from the Revenue Reserve for Capital Schemes, grants, developer contributions and capital receipts arising from the sale of assets.

- 5.2 The borrowing of monies purely to invest or on-lend and make a return is unlawful and this Council will not engage in such activity.

## 6 Current treasury position

- 6.1 The Council is debt free and as such the overall treasury position at 31 December 2018 comprised only investments which totaled £43m generating an average return of 0.91%. The Council also held £5m in externally managed property fund investments at 31 December which are expected to return 3.75% in the 2018/19 financial year and 4% in subsequent years.
- 6.2 The Council has no material non-treasury investments (e.g. directly owned commercial property, shares in subsidiaries or loans to third parties).

## 7 Prospects for interest rates

- 7.1 The Council has appointed Link Asset Services as treasury advisor to the Council and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. **[Appendix 3]** draws together a number of current City forecasts for short term (Bank Rate) and longer fixed interest rates. Link's expectation for the Bank Rate for the financial year ends (March) is:
- 2018/ 2019 0.75%
  - 2019/ 2020 1.25%
  - 2020/ 2021 1.50%
  - 2021/ 2022 2.00%
- 7.2 The flow of generally positive economic data after the quarter ended 30 June 2018 led the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) on 2 August to make the first increase in Bank Rate above 0.5% since the 2008 financial crash. Growth has been healthy since that meeting, but is expected to weaken somewhat during the last quarter of 2018. At their November meeting, the MPC left Bank Rate unchanged, but expressed some concern at the Chancellor's fiscal stimulus in his Budget, which could increase inflationary pressures. However, it is unlikely that the MPC would increase Bank Rate ahead of the March Brexit deadline. The next increase in Bank Rate is therefore forecast to be in May 2019, followed by increases in February and November 2020, before ending up at 2.0% in February 2022.

- 7.3 The overall long run trend is for gilt yields, and consequently PWLB rates, to rise, albeit gently. However, over the last 25 years, we have been through a period of falling bond yields as inflation subsided to, and then stabilised at, much lower levels than before, and supported by central banks implementing substantial quantitative easing purchases of government and other debt after the financial crash of 2008. Quantitative easing, conversely, also caused a rise in equity values as investors searched for higher returns and purchased riskier assets. In 2016, we saw the start of a reversal of this trend with a sharp rise in bond yields after the US Presidential election in November 2016, with yields then rising further as a result of an increase in the US government deficit aimed at stimulating even stronger economic growth. That policy change also created concerns around a significant rise in inflationary pressures in an economy which was already running at remarkably low levels of unemployment. Unsurprisingly, the Federal Reserve (Fed) has continued on its series of robust responses to combat its perception of rising inflationary pressures by repeatedly increasing the Fed rate to reach 2.00 – 2.25% in September 2018. It has also continued its policy of not fully reinvesting proceeds from bonds that it holds as a result of quantitative easing, when they mature. We have, therefore, seen US 10 year Treasury bond yields rise above 3.2% during October 2018 and also seen investors causing a sharp fall in equity prices as they sold out of holding riskier assets.
- 7.4 Rising bond yields in the US have also caused some upward pressure on bond yields in the UK and other developed economies. However, the degree of that upward pressure has been dampened by how strong or weak the prospects for economic growth and rising inflation are in each country, and on the degree of progress towards the reversal of monetary policy away from quantitative easing and other credit stimulus measures.
- 7.5 From time to time, gilt yields, and therefore PWLB rates, can be subject to exceptional levels of volatility due to geo-political, sovereign debt crisis, emerging market developments and sharp changes in investor sentiment. Such volatility could occur at any time during the forecast period.
- 7.6 Economic and interest rate forecasting remains difficult with so many external influences weighing on the UK. The above forecasts, (and MPC decisions), will be liable to further amendment depending on how economic data and developments in financial markets transpire over the next year. Geopolitical developments, especially in the EU, could also have a major impact. Forecasts for average investment earnings beyond the three-year time horizon will be heavily dependent on economic and political developments.

7.7 Investment returns are likely to remain low during 2019/20 but to be on a gently rising trend over the next few years.

7.8 Link's more detailed view of the current economic background is included at **[Appendix 4]**.

## **8 Investment policy**

8.1 The Council's investment policy has regard to the MHCLG's Guidance on Local Government Investments and the CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes. The Council's investment priorities will be security first, liquidity second, and then yield.

8.2 In accordance with the above guidance from the MHCLG and CIPFA, and in order to minimise the risk to investments, the Council applies minimum acceptable credit criteria in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the Short Term and Long Term ratings.

8.3 Ratings are not the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To this end the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as 'credit default swaps' and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.

8.4 Other information sources used will include the financial press, share price and other information relating to the banking sector in order to establish a robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.

8.5 Investment instruments identified for use are listed in **[Appendix 5]** under 'specified' and 'non-specified' investment categories. Counterparty limits are detailed in section 10 below.

## **9 Creditworthiness policy**

9.1 The creditworthiness service provided by Link has been progressively enhanced over the last few years and now uses a sophisticated modelling approach with credit ratings from all three rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. The credit ratings are supplemented using the following overlays:

- Credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
- Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings; and
- Sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.

9.2 This modelling approach combines credit ratings, credit watches and credit outlooks in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads for which the end product is a series of colour code bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness of counterparties. These colour codes are also used by the Council to inform the duration of an investment and are therefore referred to as durational bands. The Council is satisfied that this service now gives a much improved level of security for its investments.

9.3 The selection of counterparties with a high level of creditworthiness is achieved by selecting institutions down to a minimum durational band within Link's weekly credit list of potential counterparties (worldwide). Subject to an appropriate sovereign and counterparty rating the Council uses counterparties within the following durational bands:

Yellow/Pink	5 years
Purple	2 years
Blue	1 year (nationalised or part nationalised UK Banks)
Orange	1 year
Red	6 months
Green	100 Days

9.4 The Council does not use the approach suggested by CIPFA of using the lowest rating from all three rating agencies to determine creditworthy counterparties. Moody's tends to be more aggressive in giving low ratings than the other two agencies and adopting the CIPFA approach may leave the Council with too few banks on its approved lending list. The Link creditworthiness service uses a wider array of information than just primary ratings and in combination with a risk weighted scoring system undue preponderance is not given to any one agency's ratings.

9.5 All credit ratings are reviewed weekly and monitored on a daily basis. The Council is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of the Link creditworthiness service.

- If a downgrade results in the counterparty no longer meeting the Council's minimum criteria its use for new investment is withdrawn immediately.

- In addition to the use of credit ratings the Council is advised of movements in Credit Default Swap data against the iTraxx benchmark and other market data on a daily basis. Extreme market movements may result in a scaling back of the duration assessment or removal from the Councils lending list altogether.

9.6 Sole reliance is not placed on the use of the Link service. In addition the Council uses market information including information on any external support for banks to assist the decision making process.

## 10 Country, counterparty and group exposure limits

10.1 The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from the UK subject to a minimum sovereign credit rating of A- and from other countries subject to a minimum sovereign credit rating of AA-. The minimum will be the lowest rating determined by Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. The list of countries that qualify using this credit criteria as at the date of this report are shown in **[Appendix 6]**. The list will be amended in accordance with this policy should ratings change.

10.2 Avoidance of a concentration of investments in too few counterparties or countries is a key to effective diversification and in this regard the limits set out below are thought to achieve a prudent balance between risk and practicality.

<b>Country, Counterparty and Group exposure</b>	<b>Maximum Proportion of Portfolio</b>
UK regulated financial institutions subject to UK Sovereign rating of A- or higher and the institution limits detailed below.	100%
Non-UK regulated financial institutions as an amount per sovereign rated AA- or higher and subject to the institution limits detailed below.	20%
Group of related financial institutions.	20%
Each financial institution rated Fitch A-, F1 or higher (green excluding CDS using Link's credit methodology).	20%
Each UK nationalised or part nationalised bank rated Fitch BBB, F2 or higher (green excluding CDS using Link's credit methodology).	20%
Each AAA rated multilateral / supranational bank.	20%
Each AAA rated CNAV, LVNAV or VNAV money market fund.	20%

Each AAA rated enhanced cash fund / government liquidity fund / gilt fund subject to a maximum 20% exposure to all such funds.	10%
Non-specified investments over 1 year duration.	60%
Each non-rated property fund used for long term investment subject to a maximum £3m (20% of expected long term balances) per fund and across all such funds. No limit applies to new resources made available from, or in anticipation of, the sale of existing property assets or other windfalls.	N/A
Each non-rated diversified income (multi-asset) fund used for medium term investment subject to a maximum £3m (20% of expected long term balances) per fund and across all such funds.	N/A

- 10.3 Cash flow balances vary depending on the timing of receipts and payments during the month and from month to month. The investment limits identified in paragraph 10.2 will be based on an estimate of the expected average daily cash flow balance at the start of the financial year augmented by core cash and other balances.

## 11 Cash flow and core fund investment

- 11.1 Funds available for investment are split between cash flow and core cash. Cash flow funds are generated from the collection of council tax, business rates and other income streams. They are consumed during the financial year to meet payments to precepting authorities and government (NNDR contributions) and to meet service delivery costs (benefit payments, staff salaries and suppliers in general). The consumption of cash flow funds during the course of a financial year places a natural limit on the maximum duration of investments (up to one year). Core funds comprise monies set aside in the Council's revenue and capital reserves and are generally available to invest for durations in excess of one year.

- 11.2 **Cash flow investments.** The average daily cash flow balance throughout 2019/20 is expected to be £12m with a proportion available for longer than three months. Cash flow investments will be made with reference to cash flow requirements (liquidity) and the outlook for short-term interest rates i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months. Liquidity will be maintained by using bank deposit accounts and money markets funds. Where duration can be tolerated, additional yield will be generated by utilising term deposits with banks and building societies and enhanced cash funds. Cash balances available for more than 3

months may be transferred to the core fund portfolio if a better overall return for the Council can be achieved by doing so.

- 11.3 In compiling the Council's estimates for 2019/20 a return on cash flow investments of 0.93% has been assumed.
- 11.4 **Core fund investments.** Historically the Council's core funds have been managed by an external fund manager. All core funds were returned to the Council for in-house management during 2014/15. The core fund balance is diminishing as a proportion is consumed each year (approximately £2m per annum) to support the Council's revenue budget and capital expenditure plans. The average core fund balance during 2019/20 is expected to be £14m.
- 11.5 The Council will avoid locking into longer term deals while investment rates continue their current low levels unless attractive rates are available with counterparties of particularly high creditworthiness which make longer term deals worthwhile and are within the risk parameters set by the Council.
- 11.6 In compiling the Council's estimates for 2019/20 a return on core fund investments of 1.23% has been assumed. Subject to the credit quality and exposure limits outlined in paragraph 10.2, liquidity and yield will be achieved by a mix of investments using predominantly fixed term deposits and certificates of deposit. Notice accounts and enhanced cash funds will also be used if these offer favourable returns relative to term deposits.

## **12 Medium and long term investment.**

- 12.1 The strategy includes provision (paragraph 10.2 and detailed in Appendix 5) to undertake medium term investment in diversified income (cash, bonds, equity and property) through an externally managed collective investment scheme (fund). Investment in such schemes typically implies a 5 year commitment to recoup entry and exit fees and mitigate the impact of a fall in the value of assets under management.
- 12.2 A detailed evaluation of the funds asset quality, market risk, redemption constraints, management and governance arrangements will be undertaken in advance of any investment taking place. Any sums invested will be reported at regular intervals with income received and changes in capital value separately identified.
- 12.3 The strategy includes provision (paragraph 10.2 and detailed in Appendix 5) to undertake long term investment in property through an

externally managed collective investment scheme (fund). Investment in such schemes typically implies a 10 year commitment to recoup entry and exit fees. To mitigate the risk that capital values may fall due to changes in economic activity, investment duration cannot be determined with certainty at the time the investment commences. As a consequence any cash balances applied to such an investment must be available for the long term and there must be flexibility over the timing of redemption(s) in the future. Sums invested will be reported at regular intervals with income received and changes in capital value separately identified.

**13 Year end investment report**

- 13.1 At the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

**14 Policy on the use of external service providers**

- 14.1 The Council uses Link Asset Services as its external treasury management advisors.
- 14.2 The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the Council at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external service providers.
- 14.3 It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

**January 2019**

**Appendices**

1. Treasury management scheme of delegation
2. Prudential and treasury indicators
3. Interest rate forecasts
4. Economic background provided by Link Asset Services
5. Credit and counterparty risk management (TMP1)
6. Approved countries for investments

**Appendix 1 Treasury management scheme of delegation****Full Council**

- Budget approval.
- Approval of treasury management policy.
- Approval of the annual treasury management and investment strategy.
- Approval of amendments to the Council's adopted clauses, treasury management policy and annual treasury management and investment strategy.
- Approval of the treasury management outturn and mid-year reports.

**Cabinet**

- Budget consideration.
- Approval of the division of responsibilities.
- Approval of the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment.
- Acting on recommendations in connection with monitoring reports.

**Audit Committee**

- Reviewing the annual treasury management and investment strategy and making recommendations to Cabinet and Council.
- Receive reports on treasury activity at regular intervals during the year and making recommendations to Cabinet.
- Reviewing treasury management policy, practices and procedures and making recommendations to Cabinet and Council.

**Finance, Innovation and Property Advisory Board**

- Receiving budgetary control reports at regular intervals that include treasury management performance.

**The S151 (responsible) officer**

- Recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance.
- Submitting regular treasury management policy reports.
- Submitting budgets and budget variations.
- Receiving and reviewing management information reports.
- Reviewing the performance of the treasury management function.
- Ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function.
- Prepare and maintain effective treasury management practices (TMPs).
- Ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit.
- Recommending the appointment of external service providers.
- Preparation of a Capital Strategy and for ensuring the strategy is sustainable, affordable and prudent in the long term and that due diligence has been carried out on all investment and is in accordance with the risk appetite of the authority.

## Appendix 2 Prudential and treasury indicators

The prudential indicators relating to capital expenditure cannot be set until the capital programme is finally determined and will as a consequence be reported as part of the Setting the Budget for 2019/20 report that is to be submitted to Cabinet on 14 February 2019.

The treasury management indicators are as set out in the table below:

TREASURY MANAGEMENT INDICATORS	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21	2021/22
	Actual	Estimate	Estimate	Estimate	Estimate
	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
Authorised Limit for external debt :					
borrowing	Nil	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
other long term liabilities	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
TOTAL	Nil	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
Operational Boundary for external debt:-					
borrowing	Nil	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000
other long term liabilities	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
TOTAL	Nil	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000
Actual external debt	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Upper limit for fixed interest rate exposure > 1 year at year end	Nil	It is anticipated that exposure will range between 0% to 60%			
Upper limit for variable rate exposure < 1 year at year end	13,434 (45.6%)	It is anticipated that exposure will range between 40% to 100%			
Upper limit for total principal sums invested for over 365 days at year end	3,000 (10.2%)	60% of funds			

Maturity structure of fixed rate borrowing during 2017/18 - 2021/22	upper limit	lower limit
under 12 months	100 %	0 %
Over 12 months	0 %	0 %

## Appendix 3

## Interest rate forecasts – December 2018

<b>Bank Rate</b>											
	Now	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19	Mar-20	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21
Link Asset Services	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.25%	1.50%	1.50%
Capital Economics	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.25%	1.50%	1.50%	1.75%	1.75%	2.00%	-
<b>5yr PWLB Rate</b>											
	Now	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19	Mar-20	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21
Link Asset Services	1.76%	2.00%	2.10%	2.20%	2.20%	2.30%	2.30%	2.40%	2.50%	2.50%	2.60%
Capital Economics	1.76%	1.95%	2.03%	2.15%	2.40%	2.65%	2.70%	2.75%	2.80%	2.85%	-
<b>10yr PWLB Rate</b>											
	Now	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19	Mar-20	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21
Link Asset Services	2.18%	2.50%	2.50%	2.60%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%
Capital Economics	2.18%	2.30%	2.43%	2.55%	2.80%	3.05%	3.05%	3.05%	3.05%	3.05%	-
<b>25yr PWLB Rate</b>											
	Now	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19	Mar-20	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21
Link Asset Services	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%	3.40%	3.40%
Capital Economics	2.80%	2.83%	2.96%	3.08%	3.33%	3.58%	3.53%	3.48%	3.43%	3.38%	-
<b>50yr PWLB Rate</b>											
	Now	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19	Mar-20	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21
Link Asset Services	2.68%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.20%
Capital Economics	2.68%	2.65%	2.78%	2.90%	3.15%	3.40%	3.40%	3.40%	3.40%	3.40%	-

<b>Link Asset Services Interest Rate View</b>												
	Now	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19	Mar-20	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21	Jun-21
Bank Rate	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.25%	1.50%	1.50%	1.75%
3 Month LIBID	0.68%	0.80%	0.90%	1.00%	1.10%	1.20%	1.30%	1.40%	1.50%	1.50%	1.60%	1.70%
6 Month LIBID	0.78%	0.90%	1.00%	1.20%	1.30%	1.40%	1.50%	1.60%	1.70%	1.70%	1.80%	1.90%
12 Month LIBID	0.95%	1.10%	1.20%	1.30%	1.40%	1.50%	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%

## Appendix 4 Economic background provided by Link Asset Services

**GLOBAL OUTLOOK.** World growth has been buoyant aided by strong growth in the US. However, US growth is likely to fall back in 2019 and, together with weakening economic activity in China, overall world growth is likely to weaken.

**Inflation** has been weak during 2018 but, at long last, unemployment falling to remarkably low levels in the US and UK has led to a marked acceleration of wage inflation which is likely to prompt central banks into a series of increases in central rates. The EU is expected to follow a similar progression.

### **KEY RISKS - central bank monetary policy measures**

Looking back on nearly ten years since the financial crash of 2008 when liquidity suddenly dried up in financial markets, it can be assessed that central banks' monetary policy measures to counter the sharp world recession were successful. The key monetary policy measures they used were a combination of lowering central interest rates and flooding financial markets with liquidity, particularly through unconventional means such as quantitative easing (QE), where central banks bought large amounts of central government debt and smaller sums of other debt.

**The key issue now** is that that period of stimulating economic recovery and warding off the threat of deflation, is coming towards its close. A new period has already started in the US, and more recently in the UK, of reversing those measures i.e. by raising central rates and, (for the US), reducing central banks' holdings of government and other debt. These measures are now required in order to stop the trend of a reduction in spare capacity in the economy, and of unemployment falling to such low levels that the re-emergence of inflation is viewed as a major risk. It is, therefore, crucial that central banks get their timing right and do not cause shocks to market expectations that could destabilise financial markets. In particular, a key risk is that because QE-driven purchases of bonds drove up the price of government debt, and therefore caused a sharp drop in income yields, this also encouraged investors into a search for yield and into investing in riskier assets such as equities. Consequently, prices in both bond and equity markets rose to historically high valuation levels simultaneously. This now means that both asset categories are vulnerable to a sharp downward correction. It is important, therefore, that central banks only gradually unwind their holdings of bonds in order to prevent destabilising the financial markets. It is also likely that the timeframe for central banks unwinding their holdings of QE debt purchases will be over several years. They need to balance their timing to neither squash economic recovery, by taking too rapid and too strong action, nor, conversely, let inflation run away by taking action that was too slow and/or too weak. **The potential for central banks to get this timing and strength of action wrong are now key risks.**

The world economy also needs to adjust to a sharp change in **liquidity creation** over the last five years where the US has moved from boosting liquidity by QE purchases, to reducing its holdings of debt. In addition, the European Central Bank has cut back its QE purchases substantially and is likely to end them completely by the end of 2018.

**UK.** The flow of positive economic statistics since the end of the first quarter 2018 has shown that pessimism was overdone about the poor growth in quarter 1 when adverse weather caused a temporary downward blip. Quarter 1 at 0.1% growth in GDP was followed by a return to 0.4% in quarter 2; quarter 3 is expected to be robust at around +0.6% but quarter 4 is expected to weaken from that level.

At their November meeting, the MPC repeated their well-worn phrase that future Bank Rate increases would be gradual and would rise to a much lower equilibrium rate, (where monetary policy is neither expansionary or contractionary), than before the crash; indeed they gave a figure for this of around 2.5% in ten years' time but declined to give a medium term forecast. However, with so much uncertainty around Brexit, they warned that the next move could be up or down, even if there was a disorderly Brexit. While it would be expected that Bank Rate could be cut if there was a significant fall in GDP growth as a result of a disorderly Brexit, so as to provide a stimulus to growth, they warned they could also raise Bank Rate in the same scenario if there was a boost to inflation from a devaluation of sterling, increases in import prices and more expensive goods produced in the UK replacing cheaper goods previously imported, and so on. In addition, the Chancellor has held back some spare capacity to provide a further fiscal stimulus if needed.

It is unlikely that the MPC would increase Bank Rate in February 2019, ahead of the deadline in March for Brexit. Getting parliamentary approval for a Brexit agreement on both sides of the Channel will take well into spring next year. However, in view of the hawkish stance of the MPC at their November meeting, the next increase in Bank Rate is now forecast to be in May 2019. The following increases are then forecast to be in February and November 2020 before ending up at 2.0% in February 2022.

**Inflation.** The Consumer Price Index (CPI) measure of inflation has been falling from a peak of 3.1% in November 2017 to 2.4% in October. In the November Bank of England quarterly inflation report, inflation was forecast to still be marginally above its 2% inflation target two years ahead, (at about 2.1%), given a scenario of minimal increases in Bank Rate. This inflation forecast is likely to be amended upwards due to the Bank's inflation report being produced prior to the Chancellor's announcement of a significant fiscal stimulus in the Budget; this is likely to add 0.3% to GDP growth at a time when there is little spare capacity left in the economy, particularly of labour.

As for the **labour market** figures in September, unemployment at 4.1% was marginally above a 43 year low of 4% on the Independent Labour Organisation measure. A combination of job vacancies hitting an all-time high, together with negligible growth in total employment numbers, indicates that employers are now having major difficulties filling job vacancies with suitable staff. It was therefore unsurprising that wage inflation picked up to 3.2%, (3 month average regular pay, excluding bonuses). This meant that in real terms, (i.e. wage rates less CPI inflation), earnings are currently growing by about 0.8%, the highest level since 2009. This increase in household spending power is likely to feed through into providing some support to the overall rate of economic growth in the coming months. This tends to confirm that the MPC was right to start on a cautious increase in Bank Rate in August as it views wage inflation in excess of 3% as increasing inflationary pressures within the UK economy.

In the **political arena**, there is a risk that the current Conservative minority government may be unable to muster a majority in the Commons over Brexit. However, our central position is that Prime Minister May's government will endure, despite various setbacks, along the route to reaching an orderly Brexit in March 2019. If, however, the UK faces a general election in the next 12 months, this could result in a potential loosening of monetary and fiscal policy and therefore medium to longer dated gilt yields could rise on the expectation of a weak pound and concerns around inflation picking up.

**USA.** President Trump's massive easing of fiscal policy is fuelling a, (temporary), boost in consumption which has generated an upturn in the rate of strong growth which rose from 2.2%, (annualised rate), in quarter 1 to 4.2% in quarter 2 and 3.5%, (3.0% y/y), in quarter 3, but also an upturn in inflationary pressures. In particular, wage rates were increasing at 3.1% y/y in October and heading higher due to unemployment falling to a 49 year low of 3.7%. With CPI inflation over the target rate of 2% and on a rising trend towards 3%, the Fed increased rates another 0.25% in September to between 2.00% and 2.25%, this being the fourth increase in 2018. They also indicated that they expected to increase rates four more times by the end of 2019. The dilemma, however, is what to do when the temporary boost to consumption wanes, particularly as the recent imposition of tariffs on a number of countries' exports to the US, (China in particular), could see a switch to US production of some of those goods, but at higher prices. Such a scenario would invariably make any easing of monetary policy harder for the Fed in the second half of 2019. However, a combination of an expected four increases in rates of 0.25% by the end of 2019, together with a waning of the boost to economic growth from the fiscal stimulus in 2018, could combine to depress growth below its potential rate, i.e. monetary policy may prove to be too aggressive and lead to the Fed having to start on cutting rates. The Fed has also been unwinding its previous quantitative easing purchases of debt by gradually

increasing the amount of monthly maturing debt that it has not been reinvesting.

The tariff war between the US and China has been generating a lot of heat during 2018, but it is not expected that the current level of actual action would have much in the way of a significant effect on US or world growth. However, there is a risk of escalation. The results of the mid-term elections are not expected to have a material effect on the economy.

**Eurozone.** Growth was 0.4% in quarters 1 and 2 but fell back to 0.2% in quarter 3, though this is probably just a temporary dip. In particular, data from Germany has been mixed and it could be negatively impacted by US tariffs on a significant part of manufacturing exports e.g. cars. For that reason, although growth is still expected to be in the region of nearly 2% for 2018, the horizon is less clear than it seemed just a short while ago. Having halved its quantitative easing purchases of debt in October 2018 to €15bn per month, the European Central Bank has indicated it is likely to end all further purchases in December 2018. Inflationary pressures are starting to build gently so it is expected that the ECB will start to increase rates towards the end of 2019.

**China.** Economic growth has been weakening over successive years, despite repeated rounds of central bank stimulus; medium term risks are increasing. Major progress still needs to be made to eliminate excess industrial capacity and the stock of unsold property, and to address the level of non-performing loans in the banking and credit systems. Progress has been made in reducing the rate of credit creation, particularly from the shadow banking sector, which is feeding through into lower economic growth. There are concerns that official economic statistics are inflating the published rate of growth.

**Japan** has been struggling to stimulate consistent significant GDP growth and to get inflation up to its target of 2%, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. It is also making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy. It is likely that loose monetary policy will endure for some years yet to try to stimulate growth and modest inflation.

**Emerging countries.** Argentina and Turkey are currently experiencing major headwinds and are facing challenges in external financing requirements well in excess of their reserves of foreign exchange. However, these countries are small in terms of the overall world economy, (around 1% each), so the fallout from the expected recessions in these countries will be minimal.

**INTEREST RATE FORECASTS.** The interest rate forecasts provided by Link Asset Services in paragraph 7.1 are predicated on an assumption of an agreement being reached on Brexit between the UK and the EU. In the event

of an orderly non-agreement exit, it is likely that the Bank of England would take action to cut Bank Rate from 0.75% in order to help economic growth deal with the adverse effects of this situation. This is also likely to cause short to medium term gilt yields to fall. If there was a disorderly Brexit, then any cut in Bank Rate would be likely to last for a longer period and also depress short and medium gilt yields correspondingly. It is also possible that the government could act to protect economic growth by implementing fiscal stimulus.

### **The balance of risks to the UK**

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably neutral.
- The balance of risks to increases in Bank Rate and shorter term PWLB rates, are probably also even and are broadly dependent on how strong GDP growth turns out, how slowly inflation pressures subside, and how quickly the Brexit negotiations move forward positively.

One risk that is both an upside and downside risk, is that all central banks are now working in very different economic conditions than before the 2008 financial crash as there has been a major increase in consumer and other debt due to the exceptionally low levels of borrowing rates that have prevailed for ten years since 2008. This means that the neutral rate of interest in an economy, (i.e. the rate that is neither expansionary nor deflationary), is difficult to determine definitively in this new environment, although central banks have made statements that they expect it to be much lower than before 2008. Central banks could therefore either over or under do increases in central interest rates.

### **Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:**

- If **Brexit** were to cause significant economic disruption and a major downturn in the rate of growth.
- **Bank of England monetary policy** takes action too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
- A resurgence of the **Eurozone sovereign debt crisis**.
- Weak capitalisation of some **European banks**.
- **Political developments** in EU countries.
- Further increases in interest rates in the US could spark a **sudden flight of investment funds** from more risky assets e.g. shares, into bonds yielding a much improved yield. In October 2018, we have seen a sharp fall in equity markets but this has been limited, as yet. Emerging countries which have borrowed heavily in dollar denominated debt, could be particularly exposed to this risk of an investor flight to safe havens e.g. UK gilts.

- There are concerns around the level of **US corporate debt** which has increased significantly during the period of low borrowing rates in order to finance mergers and acquisitions. This has resulted in the debt of many large corporations being downgraded to the lower end of investment grade. If such corporations fail to generate profits and cash flow to reduce their debt levels as expected further rating downgrades will increase their cost of financing and further negatively impact profits and cash flow.
- **Geopolitical risks**, especially North Korea, but also in Europe and the Middle East, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.

### **Upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PwLB rates:**

- **Brexit** – if both sides were to agree a compromise that removed all threats of economic and political disruption.
- **The Fed causing a sudden shock in financial markets** through misjudging the pace and strength of increases in its Fed. Funds Rate and in the pace and strength of reversal of QE, which then leads to a fundamental reassessment by investors of the relative risks of holding bonds, as opposed to equities. This could lead to a major flight from bonds to equities and a sharp increase in bond yields in the US, which could then spill over into impacting bond yields around the world.
- The **Bank of England is too slow** in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflation pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a later rapid series of increases in Bank Rate faster than we currently expect.
- **UK inflation**, whether domestically generated or imported, returning to sustained significantly higher levels causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.

Link Asset Services  
December 2018

## Appendix 5 Credit and counterparty risk management (TMP1)

All specified and non-specified Investments will be:

Subject to the sovereign, counterparty and group exposure limits identified in the Annual Investment Strategy (Section 10).

Subject to the duration limit suggested by Link (+6 months for UK financial institutions) at the time each investment is placed.

Subject to a maximum of 60% of funds being held in non-specified investments at any one time.

Sterling denominated.

### Specified Investments (maturities up to 1 year):

investment	Minimum Credit Criteria
UK Debt Management Agency Deposit Facility	UK Sovereign A-
Term deposits - UK local authorities	UK Sovereign A-
Term deposits - UK nationalised and part nationalised banks	UK Sovereign A- Counterparty BBB, F2 or Green excluding CDS
Term deposits – all other banks and building societies	UK Sovereign A- / Non-UK Sovereign AA- Counterparty A-, F1 or Green excluding CDS
Certificates of deposit - UK nationalised and part nationalised banks	UK Sovereign A- Counterparty BBB, F2 or Green excluding CDS
Certificates of deposit – all other banks and building societies	UK Sovereign A- / Non-UK Sovereign AA- Counterparty A-, F1, or Green excluding CDS
UK Treasury Bills	UK Sovereign A-
UK Government Gilts	UK Sovereign A-
Bonds issued by multi-lateral development banks	AAA
Sovereign bond issues (other than the UK govt)	AAA
Money Market Funds (CNAV, LVNAV or VNAV)	AAA
Enhanced Cash and Government Liquidity Funds	AAA

**Non-specified Investments** (maturities in excess of 1 year and any maturity if not included above):

Investment	Minimum Credit Criteria	Max duration to maturity
Fixed term deposits with variable rate and variable maturities (structured deposits) - UK nationalised and part nationalised banks	UK Sovereign A-	2 years
Fixed term deposits with variable rate and variable maturities (structured deposits) - banks and building societies	UK sovereign A- / Non-UK Sovereign AA-. Counterparty A-, F1 (Green)	2 years
Term deposits - local authorities	UK Sovereign A-	2 years
Term deposits - UK nationalised and part nationalised banks	UK Sovereign A-	2 years
Term deposits – banks, building societies	UK Sovereign A- / Non-UK Sovereign AA-. Counterparty A-, F1 (Green)	2 years
Certificates of deposit - UK nationalised and part nationalised banks	UK Sovereign A-	2 years
Certificates of deposit – banks and building societies	UK Sovereign A- / Non-UK Sovereign AA-. Counterparty A-, F1 (Green)	2 years
Commercial paper - UK nationalised and part nationalised banks	UK Sovereign A-	2 years
Commercial paper - banks and building societies	UK Sovereign A- / Non-UK Sovereign AA-. Counterparty A-, F1 (Green)	2 years
Floating rate notes issued by multilateral development banks	AAA	5 years
Bonds issued by multilateral development banks	AAA	5 years
Sovereign bond issues (other than the UK Government)	AAA	5 years
UK Government Gilts	UK Sovereign A-	25% 5 years
Property Funds	N/A	N/A
Diversified Income Funds	N/A	N/A

**Accounting treatment of investments.** The accounting treatment may differ from the underlying cash transactions arising from investment decisions made. To ensure that the Council is protected from any adverse revenue impact, which may arise from these differences, we will review the accounting implications of new transactions before they are undertaken.

## Appendix 6      Approved countries for investments

Each financial institution must meet the minimum credit criteria specified in the Annual Investment Strategy (Section 10). For non-UK regulated institutions the institutions sovereign must be rated AA- or higher by each of the three rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's.

This list will be reviewed and amended if appropriate on a weekly basis by the Director of Finance and Transformation.

As of 31 December 2018 sovereigns meeting the above requirement which also (except for Hong Kong, Norway and Luxembourg) have banks operating in sterling markets with credit ratings of green or above on the Link Asset Services' Credit Worthiness List were:

AAA	Australia Canada Denmark Germany Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Singapore Sweden Switzerland
AA+	Finland USA
AA	Abu Dhabi (UAE) France Hong Kong
AA-	Belgium Qatar

At 31<sup>st</sup> December 2018 the UK received a credit rating of AA from each of Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's.