

Treasury Management and Annual Investment Strategy 2022/23

1 Introduction

1.1 Treasury management is defined as:

‘The management of the local authority’s borrowing, investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks’.

1.2 The strategy covers:

- Statutory and regulatory requirements
- Balanced budget requirement
- Prudential and treasury Indicators
- Borrowing requirement
- Current treasury position
- Prospects for interest rates
- Investment policy
- Creditworthiness policy
- Country, counterparty and group exposure limits
- Cash flow and core fund investment
- Medium and long term investment
- Year end investment report
- Policy on use of external service providers.

2 Statutory and regulatory requirements

- 2.1 The Local Government Act 2003 (the Act) and supporting regulations requires the Council to ‘have regard to’ the Chartered Institute of Public Finance (CIPFA) Prudential Code and the CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice to set Prudential and Treasury Indicators for the next three years to ensure that the Council’s capital investment plans are affordable, prudent and sustainable.
- 2.2 The Act requires the Council to set out its Treasury Management Strategy for borrowing and to prepare an Annual Investment Strategy

which sets out the Council's policies for managing its investments and for giving priority to the **security** and **liquidity** of those investments.

- 2.3 The Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) issued revised Statutory Guidance on Local Government Investments (2018 Edition). CIPFA also amended the Prudential Code for Capital Finance in Local Authorities (2017 Edition) and the Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice and Cross Sectorial Guidance Notes (2017 Edition). The MHCLG and CIPFA Codes came into effect on 1st April 2018.
- 2.4 Historically the scope of the statutory guidance and CIPFA codes was limited to the investment of an authority's cash surpluses and the management of borrowing undertaken to support its capital expenditure plans. The updated statutory guidance and codes broaden that scope to include expenditure on loans and the acquisition of non-financial assets (property) intended to generate a profit. The Council has not engaged in any commercial investments and has no material non-treasury investments.
- 2.5 The Council formally adopted the revised CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice (2017 Edition) on 30 October 2018. The primary requirements of the Code are as follows:
- Creation and maintenance of a Treasury Management Policy Statement which sets out the policies and objectives of the Council's treasury management activities.
 - Creation and maintenance of Treasury Management Practices which set out the manner in which the Council will seek to achieve those policies and objectives.
 - Receipt by the full Council of an Annual Treasury Management Strategy, including the Annual Investment Strategy, for the year ahead; a mid-year Review Report; and an Annual Report (stewardship report) covering activities during the previous year.
 - Delegation by the Council of responsibilities for implementing and monitoring treasury management policies and practices and for the execution and administration of treasury management decisions.
 - Delegation by the Council of the role of scrutiny of the Treasury Management Strategy and policies to a specific named body. For this Council the delegated body is the Audit Committee.
- 2.6 The scheme of delegation and role of the Section 151 officer that give effect to these requirements are set out at **[Appendix 1]**.

3 **Balanced budget requirement**

3.1 It is a statutory requirement under Section 33 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992, for the Council to produce a balanced budget. In particular, Section 32 requires a local authority to calculate its budget requirement for each financial year to include the revenue costs that flow from capital financing decisions. This means that increases in capital expenditure must be limited to a level whereby increases in charges to revenue from:

- increases in interest charges caused by increased borrowing to finance additional capital expenditure, and
- any increases in running costs from new capital projects are limited to a level which is affordable within the projected income of the Council for the foreseeable future.

4 **Prudential and treasury indicators**

4.1 It is a statutory duty under Section 3 of the Act and supporting regulations, for the Council to determine and keep under review how much it can afford to borrow. The amount so determined is termed the 'Affordable Borrowing Limit'. In England and Wales the Authorised Limit represents the legislative limit specified in the Act.

4.2 The Council must have regard to the Prudential Code when setting the 'Authorised Limit', which essentially requires it to ensure that total capital investment remains within sustainable limits and, in particular, that the impact upon its future council tax levels is 'acceptable'.

4.3 Whilst termed an 'Affordable Borrowing Limit', the capital plans to be considered for inclusion may incorporate financing by both external borrowing and other forms of liability, such as credit arrangements. The 'Authorised Limit' is to be set, on a rolling basis, for the forthcoming financial year and two successive financial years.

4.4 Prudential and Treasury Indicators relevant to setting an integrated treasury management strategy are set out in **[Appendix 2]**.

5 **Borrowing requirement**

5.1 Other than for cash flow purposes and then within the limits set out at **[Appendix 2]** borrowing will not be necessary. All capital expenditure prior to 2028/29 is expected to be funded from the Revenue Reserve for Capital Schemes, grants, developer contributions and capital receipts arising from the sale of assets. This does not however,

preclude a decision to borrow in order to fund in full or in part a capital investment opportunity that meets the Council's strategic priorities and objectives, achieves value for money and delivers a financial return. Each such opportunity to be considered on a case by case basis as appropriate.

- 5.2 The borrowing of monies purely to invest or on-lend and make a return is unlawful and this Council will not engage in such activity.

6 Current treasury position

- 6.1 The Council is debt free and as such the overall treasury position at 31 December 2021 comprised only investments. On that date the Council's cash flow and core fund investments totaled £58m and was invested in a mix of money market funds, bank notice accounts and time deposits with banks and building societies. The average duration to maturity of the portfolio was 48 days with a weighted average rate of return 0.17%. Returns in future years are expected to improve as Bank Rate increases are implemented. Income from investments forms part of the Council's ten year medium term financial strategy (MTFS). An updated MTFS will be presented to Council in February 2022.
- 6.2 The Council held £5m in externally managed property fund investments at 31 December 2021. The property funds are expected to generate a stable income of 4% in 2022/23 and this level should continue in future years. Overtime, the rise in the value of each property funds' assets (capital appreciation) is expected to negate fund entry and exit costs.
- 6.3 The Council also held £4.25m in externally managed multi asset fund investments at 31 December 2021. The multi asset funds are expected to generate income of 3.4% in 2022/23 rising to 4% in future years. Over time the rise in the value of each multi asset funds' assets (capital appreciation) is expected to negate and fund entry and exit costs where applicable.
- 6.4 At present the Council has no material non-treasury investments (e.g. directly owned commercial property, shares in subsidiaries or loans to third parties). The procedures, practices and governance arrangements to enable the Council to meet the requirements of the Chartered Institute of Public Finance & Accountancy's Treasury Management and Prudential Codes of Practice 2017 and the 2018 Statutory Guidance on Local Government Investments relating to non-treasury investments are referred to in the reports to Audit Committee 1 October 2018 and 20 January 2020. The Audit Committee report of 18 January 2021 was endorsed by Council approving appropriate Non-treasury Management Practices.

7 Prospects for interest rates

7.1 The Council has appointed Link Asset Services as treasury advisor to the Council and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. Link's current interest rate forecast is provided at **[Appendix 3]**. Link's expectation for Bank Rate, for each financial year ending March, are:

- 2022/ 2023 0.75%
- 2023/ 2024 1.00%
- 2024/ 2025 1.25%

7.2 The forecast may be overly optimistic (downside risks) dependent on:

- Mutations of the virus render current vaccines ineffective, and tweaked vaccines to combat these mutations are delayed or unable to be administered fast enough to stop the NHS being overwhelmed, resulting in further national lockdowns or severe regional restrictions.
- Labour and supply shortages prove more enduring and disruptive and depress economic activity.
- Bank of England acts too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than currently anticipated.

7.3 The forecast may be overly pessimistic (upside risk) dependent on:

- The Bank of England is too slow in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflationary pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a later rapid series of increases in Bank Rate than we currently expect.
- Longer term US treasury yields rise strongly and pull gilt yields up higher than forecast.

7.4 Link's more detailed view of the current economic background is included at **[Appendix 4]**.

8 Investment policy

8.1 The Council's investment policy has regard to the MHCLG's Guidance on Local Government Investments and the CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral

Guidance Notes. The Council's investment priorities will be security first, liquidity second, and then yield.

- 8.2 In accordance with the above guidance from the MHCLG and CIPFA, and in order to minimise the risk to investments, the Council applies minimum acceptable credit criteria in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the Short Term and Long Term ratings.
- 8.3 Ratings are not the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment also takes account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To this end the Council engages with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as 'credit default swaps' and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.
- 8.4 Other information sources used includes the financial press, share price and other information relating to the banking sector in order to establish a robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.
- 8.5 Investment instruments identified for use are listed in **[Appendix 5]** under 'specified' and 'non-specified' investment categories. Counterparty limits are detailed in section 10 below.

9 Creditworthiness policy

- 9.1 The creditworthiness service provided by Link has been progressively enhanced over the last few years and now employs a sophisticated modelling approach using credit ratings from each of the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. The credit ratings are supplemented using the following overlays:
- Credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
 - Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings; and
 - Sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.
- 9.2 This modelling approach combines credit ratings, and any assigned credit watches and credit outlooks in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads. The end product is a series of colour code bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness

of counterparties. These colour coded bands are also used by the Council to inform the duration of an investment and are therefore referred to as durational bands. The Council is satisfied that this service now gives a much improved level of security for its investments.

- 9.3 The selection of counterparties with a high level of creditworthiness is achieved by selecting institutions down to a minimum durational band within Link’s weekly credit list of potential counterparties (worldwide). Subject to an appropriate sovereign and counterparty rating the Council uses counterparties within the following durational bands:

Yellow/Pink	5 years
Purple	2 years
Blue	1 year (UK nationalised Banks)
Orange	1 year
Red	6 months
Green	100 Days

- 9.4 The Council does not use the approach suggested by CIPFA of using the lowest rating from all three rating agencies to determine creditworthy counterparties. Moody’s tends to be more aggressive in giving low ratings than the other two agencies and adopting the CIPFA approach may leave the Council with too few banks on its approved lending list. The Link creditworthiness service uses a wider array of information than just primary ratings and in combination with a risk weighted scoring system undue preponderance is not given to any one agency’s ratings.

- 9.5 All credit ratings are reviewed weekly and monitored on a daily basis. The Council is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of the Link creditworthiness service.

- If a downgrade results in the counterparty no longer meeting the Council’s minimum criteria its use for new investment is withdrawn immediately.
- In addition to the use of credit ratings the Council is advised of movements in Credit Default Swap data against the iTraxx European Financials benchmark and other market data on a daily basis. Extreme market movements may result in a scaling back of the duration assessment or removal from the Councils lending list altogether.

- 9.6 Sole reliance is not placed on the use of the Link service. In addition the Council uses market information including information on any external support for banks to assist the decision making process.

10 Country, counterparty and group exposure limits

- 10.1 The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from the UK subject to a minimum sovereign credit rating of A- and from other countries subject to a minimum sovereign credit rating of AA-. The minimum will be the lowest rating determined by Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. The list of countries that qualify using this credit criteria as at the date of this report are shown in **[Appendix 6]**. The list will be amended in accordance with this policy should ratings change.
- 10.2 Avoidance of a concentration of investments in too few counterparties or countries is a key to effective diversification and in this regard the limits set out below are thought to achieve a prudent balance between risk and practicality.

Country, Counterparty and Group exposure	Maximum Proportion of Portfolio
UK regulated institutions subject to UK Sovereign rating of A- or higher and the institution limits detailed below.	100%
Non-UK regulated institutions as an amount per sovereign rated AA- or higher and subject to the institution limits detailed below.	20%
Group of related institutions.	20%
Each financial institution rated Fitch A-, F1 or higher (green excluding CDS using Link's credit methodology) or each local authority.	20%
Each UK nationalised bank rated Fitch BBB, F2 or higher (green excluding CDS using Link's credit methodology).	20%
Each AAA rated multilateral / supranational bank.	20%
Each AAA rated CNAV, LVNAV or VNAV money market fund.	20%
Each AA or higher rated enhanced cash fund / government liquidity fund / gilt fund / ultra-short dated bond fund subject to a maximum 20% exposure to all such funds.	10%
Each housing association rated Fitch A- or higher and 20% for all housing association investment	10%
Non-specified investments over 1 year duration.	60%
Each non-rated property fund used for long term investment subject to a maximum £3m (20% of expected long term balances) per fund and across all such funds. No cash limit applies to new resources made	N/A

available from, or in anticipation of, the sale of existing property assets or other windfalls.	
Each non-rated diversified income (multi-asset) fund and or short dated bond fund used for medium term investment subject to a maximum £3m (20% of expected long term balances) per fund and across all such funds. No cash limit applies to new resources made available from, or in anticipation of, the sale of existing property assets or other windfalls.	N/A

10.3 Cash flow balances vary depending on the timing of receipts and payments during the month and from month to month. The investment limits identified in paragraph 10.2 will be based on an estimate of the expected average daily cash flow balance at the start of the financial year augmented by core cash and other balances. Counterparty investments will be managed to ensure compliance with the limits at the start and end of each financial year when balances available for investment will be at a low point.

11 Cash flow and core fund investment

11.1 Funds available for investment are split between cash flow and core cash. Cash flow funds are generated from the collection of council tax, business rates and other income streams. They are consumed during the financial year to meet payments to precept authorities and government (NNDR contributions) and to meet service delivery costs (benefit payments, staff salaries and suppliers in general). The consumption of cash flow funds during the course of a financial year places a natural limit on the maximum duration of investments (up to one year). Core funds comprise monies set aside in the Council's revenue and capital reserves and are generally available to invest for durations in excess of one year.

11.2 **Cash flow investments.** The average daily cash flow balance throughout 2022/23 is expected to be £15.5m with a proportion available for longer than three months. Cash flow investments will be made with reference to cash flow requirements (liquidity) and the outlook for short-term interest rates i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months. Liquidity will be maintained by using bank deposit accounts and money markets funds. Where duration can be tolerated, additional yield will be generated by utilising term deposits with banks and building societies and enhanced cash and government liquidity funds. Investment in ultra-short dated bond funds will also be considered. Cash balances available for more than 3 months may be transferred to

the core fund portfolio if a better overall return for the Council can be achieved by doing so.

- 11.3 In compiling the Council's estimates for 2022/23 a return on cash flow investments of 0.21% has been assumed.
- 11.4 **Core fund investments.** Historically the Council's core funds have been managed by an external fund manager. All core funds were returned to the Council for in-house management during 2014/15. The core fund balance is diminishing as a proportion is consumed each year (approximately £2m per annum) to support the Council's revenue budget and capital expenditure plans. The average core fund balance during 2022/23 is expected to be £14m.
- 11.5 The Council will avoid locking into longer term deals while investment rates continue their current low levels unless attractive rates are available with counterparties of particularly high creditworthiness which make longer term deals worthwhile and are within the risk parameters set by the Council.
- 11.6 In compiling the Council's estimates for 2022/23 a return on core fund investments of 0.46% has been assumed. Subject to the credit quality and exposure limits outlined in paragraph 10.2, liquidity and yield will be achieved by a mix of investments using predominantly fixed term deposits and certificates of deposit. Notice accounts, enhanced cash and government liquidity funds and ultra-short dated bond funds will also be used if these offer favourable returns relative to term deposits. Investment with housing associations and other local authorities will also be considered.

12 **Medium and long term investment.**

- 12.1 The strategy includes provision (paragraph 10.2 and detailed in Appendix 5) to undertake medium term investment in either short dated bond funds and or diversified income funds (a mix of cash, bonds, equity and property) through externally managed collective investment schemes. Investment in such schemes typically implies a three to five year commitment to recoup entry and exit fees and mitigate the potential for a fall in the value of assets under management.
- 12.2 A detailed evaluation of a funds asset quality, market risk, redemption constraints, management and governance arrangements will be undertaken in advance of any investment taking place. Support to identify and select the most appropriate fund(s) will be sought from the Council's treasury advisor. Any sums invested will be reported at regular intervals with income received and changes in capital value

separately identified. The strategy places an upper limit on exposure to such funds of 20% of expected long term cash balances, circa £3m.

- 12.3 The strategy includes provision (paragraph 10.2 and detailed in Appendix 5) to undertake long term investment in property through an externally managed collective investment scheme (fund). Investment in such schemes typically implies a 10 year commitment to recoup entry and exit fees. To mitigate the risk that capital values may fall due to changes in economic activity, investment duration cannot be determined with certainty at the time the investment commences. As a consequence any cash balances applied to such an investment must be available for the long term and there must be flexibility over the timing of redemption(s) in the future. Sums invested will be reported at regular intervals with income received and changes in capital value separately identified. The strategy places an upper limit on exposure to such funds from existing resources of 20% of expected long term cash balances, circa £3m. No limit applies to new resources made available from the sale of existing assets or other windfalls.

13 Year end investment report

- 13.1 At the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

14 Policy on the use of external service providers

- 14.1 The Council uses Link Asset Services as its external treasury management advisors.
- 14.2 The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the Council at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external service providers.
- 14.3 It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

Appendices

1. Treasury management scheme of delegation
2. Prudential and treasury indicators
3. Interest rate forecasts
4. Economic background provided by Link Asset Services
5. Credit and counterparty risk management (TMP1)
6. Approved countries for investments

Appendix 1 Treasury management scheme of delegation**Full Council**

- Budget approval.
- Approval of treasury management policy.
- Approval of the annual treasury management and investment strategy.
- Approval of amendments to the Council's adopted clauses, treasury management policy and annual treasury management and investment strategy.
- Approval of the treasury management outturn and mid-year reports.

Cabinet

- Budget consideration.
- Approval of the division of responsibilities.
- Approval of the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment.
- Acting on recommendations in connection with monitoring reports.

Audit Committee

- Reviewing the annual treasury management and investment strategy and making recommendations to Cabinet and Council.
- Receive reports on treasury activity at regular intervals during the year and making recommendations to Cabinet.
- Reviewing treasury management policy, practices and procedures and making recommendations to Cabinet and Council.

Finance, Innovation and Property Advisory Board

- Receiving budgetary control reports at regular intervals that include treasury management performance.

The S151 (responsible) officer

- Recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance.
- Submitting regular treasury management policy reports.
- Submitting budgets and budget variations.
- Receiving and reviewing management information reports.
- Reviewing the performance of the treasury management function.
- Ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function.
- Prepare and maintain effective treasury management practices (TMPs).
- Ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit.
- Recommending the appointment of external service providers.
- Preparation of a Capital Strategy and for ensuring the strategy is sustainable, affordable and prudent in the long term and that due diligence has been carried out to support each investment decision and those decisions are in accordance with the risk appetite of the authority.

Appendix 2 Prudential and treasury indicators

The prudential indicators relating to capital expenditure cannot be set until the capital programme is finally determined and will as a consequence be reported as part of the Setting the Budget for 2022/23 report that is to be submitted to Cabinet on 10 February 2022.

The treasury management indicators are as set out in the table below:

TREASURY MANAGEMENT INDICATORS	2020/21	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25
	Actual	Estimate	Estimate	Estimate	Estimate
	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
Authorised Limit for external debt :					
borrowing	nil	7,000	7,000	7,000	7,000
other long term liabilities	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil
TOTAL	nil	7,000	7,000	7,000	7,000
Operational Boundary for external debt:-					
borrowing	nil	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000
other long term liabilities	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil
TOTAL	nil	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000
Actual external debt	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil
Upper limit for fixed interest rate exposure > 1 year at year end	nil	It is anticipated that exposure will range between 0% to 60%			
Upper limit for variable rate exposure < 1 year at year end	19,610 (49.5%)	It is anticipated that exposure will range between 40% to 100%			
Upper limit for total principal sums invested for over 365 days at year end	9,250 (23.4%)	60% of funds			

Maturity structure of fixed rate borrowing during 2021/22 – 2024/25	upper limit	lower limit
under 12 months	100 %	0 %
Over 12 months	0 %	0 %

Appendix 3 Interest rate forecasts – December 2021

Link Group Interest Rate View 20.12.21														
	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24	Jun-24	Sep-24	Dec-24	Mar-25
BANK RATE	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25
3 month ave earnings	0.20	0.30	0.50	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
6 month ave earnings	0.40	0.50	0.60	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10
12 month ave earnings	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20
5 yr PWLB	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00
10 yr PWLB	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.30
25 yr PWLB	1.80	1.90	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50
50 yr PWLB	1.50	1.70	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30
Bank Rate														
Link	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25
Capital Economics	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	-	-	-	-	-
5yr PWLB Rate														
Link	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00
Capital Economics	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.90	-	-	-	-	-
10yr PWLB Rate														
Link	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.30
Capital Economics	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	2.00	2.00	-	-	-	-	-
25yr PWLB Rate														
Link	1.80	1.90	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50
Capital Economics	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.30	-	-	-	-	-
50yr PWLB Rate														
Link	1.50	1.70	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30
Capital Economics	1.40	1.50	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.90	2.00	2.20	2.30	-	-	-	-	-

Appendix 4 Economic background based on text provided by Link Asset Services

- 1 **UK.** Covid-19 vaccines were the game changer during 2021 which raised high hopes that life in the UK would be able to largely return to normal in the second half of the year. However, the bursting onto the scene of the Omicron mutation at the end of November, rendered the initial two doses of all vaccines largely ineffective in preventing infection. This has dashed such hopes and raises the spectre again that a fourth wave of the virus could overwhelm hospitals in early 2022. What we now know is that this mutation is very fast spreading with the potential for total case numbers to double every two to three days, although it possibly may not cause so much severe illness as previous mutations. Rather than go for full lockdowns which heavily damage the economy, the government strategy this time is focusing on getting as many people as possible to have a third (booster) vaccination after three months from the previous last injection, as a booster has been shown to restore a high percentage of immunity to Omicron to those who have had two vaccinations. There is now a race on between how quickly boosters can be given to limit the spread of Omicron, and how quickly will hospitals fill up and potentially be unable to cope. In the meantime, workers have been requested to work from home and restrictions have been placed on large indoor gatherings and hospitality venues. With the household saving rate having been exceptionally high since the first lockdown in March 2020, there is plenty of pent-up demand and purchasing power stored up for services in sectors like restaurants, travel, tourism and hotels which had been hit hard during 2021, but could now be hit hard again by either, or both, of government restrictions and/or consumer reluctance to leave home. Growth will also be lower due to people being ill and not working, similar to the pingdemic in July. The economy, therefore, faces significant headwinds although some sectors have learned how to cope well with Covid. However, the biggest impact on growth would come from another lockdown if that happened. The big question still remains as to whether any further mutations of this virus could develop which render all current vaccines ineffective, as opposed to how quickly vaccines can be modified to deal with them and enhanced testing programmes be implemented to contain their spread until tweaked vaccines become widely available.

- 2 A summary overview of the future path of **Bank Rate**:
 - In December, the Bank of England became the first major western central bank to put interest rates up in this upswing in the current business cycle in western economies as recovery progresses from the Covid recession of 2020.
 - The next increase in Bank Rate could be in February or May, dependent on how severe an impact there is from Omicron.
 - If there are lockdowns in January, this could pose a barrier for the MPC to putting Bank Rate up again as early as 3rd February.
 - With inflation expected to peak at around 6% in April, the MPC may want to be seen to be active in taking action to counter inflation on 5th May, the release date for its Quarterly Monetary Policy Report.

- The December 2021 MPC meeting was more concerned with combating inflation over the medium term than supporting economic growth in the short term.
 - Bank Rate increases beyond May are difficult to forecast as inflation is likely to drop sharply in the second half of 2022.
 - However, the MPC will want to normalise Bank Rate over the next three years so that it has its main monetary policy tool ready to use in time for the next down-turn; all rates under 2% are providing stimulus to economic growth.
 - Link have put year end 0.25% increases into Q1 of each financial year from 2023 to recognise this upward bias in Bank Rate - but the actual timing in each year is difficult to predict.
 - Covid remains a major potential downside threat in all three years as we ARE likely to get further mutations.
 - How quickly can science come up with a mutation proof vaccine, or other treatment, – and for them to be widely administered around the world?
 - Purchases of gilts under QE ended in December. Note that when Bank Rate reaches 0.50%, the MPC has said it will start running down its stock of QE.
- 3 The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) voted 8-1 to raise Bank Rate by 0.15% from 0.10% to 0.25% and unanimously decided to make no changes to its programme of quantitative easing purchases due to finish in December 2021 at a total of £895bn.
 - 4 The MPC disappointed financial markets by not raising Bank Rate at its November meeting. Until Omicron burst on the scene, most forecasters, therefore, viewed a Bank Rate increase as being near certain at this December meeting due to the way that inflationary pressures have been comprehensively building in both producer and consumer prices, and in wage rates. However, at the November meeting, the MPC decided it wanted to have assurance that the labour market would get over the end of the furlough scheme on 30th September without unemployment increasing sharply; their decision was, therefore, to wait until statistics were available to show how the economy had fared at this time.
 - 5 The disappointing 0.1% m/m rise in GDP in October which suggested that economic growth had already slowed to a crawl even before the Omicron variant was discovered in late November. Early evidence suggests growth in November might have been marginally better. Nonetheless, at such low rates of growth, the government's "Plan B" COVID-19 restrictions could cause the economy to contract in December.
 - 6 The labour market statistics for the three months to October and the single month of October were released. The fallout after the furlough scheme was smaller and shorter than the Bank of England had feared. The single-month data were more informative and showed that LFS employment fell by 240,000, unemployment increased by 75,000 and the unemployment rate rose from 3.9% in September to 4.2%. However, the weekly data suggested this didn't last long as unemployment was falling again by the end of October. What's

more, the 49,700 fall in the claimant count and the 257,000 rise in the PAYE measure of company payrolls suggests that the labour market strengthened again in November. The other side of the coin was a further rise in the number of vacancies from 1.182m to a record 1.219m in the three months to November which suggests that the supply of labour is struggling to keep up with demand, although the single-month figure for November fell for the first time since February, from 1.307m to 1.227m.

- 7 These figures by themselves, would probably have been enough to give the MPC the assurance that it could press ahead to raise Bank Rate at this December meeting. However, the advent of Omicron potentially threw a spanner into the works as it poses a major headwind to the economy which, of itself, will help to cool the economy. The financial markets, therefore, swung round to expecting no change in Bank Rate.
- 8 CPI inflation figure for November which spiked up further from 4.2% to 5.1%, confirming again how inflationary pressures have been building sharply. However, Omicron also caused a sharp fall in world oil and other commodity prices; (gas and electricity inflation has generally accounted on average for about 60% of the increase in inflation in advanced western economies).
- 9 Other elements of inflation are also transitory e.g., prices of goods being forced up by supply shortages, and shortages of shipping containers due to ports being clogged have caused huge increases in shipping costs. But these issues are likely to clear during 2022, and then prices will subside back to more normal levels. Gas prices and electricity prices will also fall back once winter is passed and demand for these falls away.
- 10 Although it is possible that the Government could step in with some **fiscal support for the economy**, the huge cost of such support to date is likely to pose a barrier to incurring further major economy wide expenditure unless it is very limited and targeted on narrow sectors like hospitality, (as announced just before Christmas). The Government may well, therefore, effectively leave it to the MPC, and to monetary policy, to support economic growth – but at a time when the threat posed by rising inflation is near to peaking!
- 11 This is the adverse set of factors against which the MPC had to decide on Bank Rate. For the second month in a row, the MPC blind-sided financial markets, this time with a **surprise increase in Bank Rate from 0.10% to 0.25%**. What's more, the hawkish tone of comments indicated that the MPC is now concerned that inflationary pressures are indeed building and need concerted action by the MPC to counter. This indicates that there will be more increases to come with financial markets predicting 1% by the end of 2022. The 8-1 vote to raise the rate shows that there is firm agreement that inflation now poses a threat, especially after the CPI figure hit a 10-year high this week. The MPC commented that “there has been significant upside news” and that “there were some signs of greater persistence in domestic costs and price pressures”.

- 12 On the other hand, it did also comment that “**the Omicron variant is likely to weigh on near-term activity**”. But it stressed that at the November meeting it had said it would raise rates if the economy evolved as it expected and that now “these conditions had been met”. It also appeared more worried about the possible boost to inflation from Omicron itself. It said that “the current position of the global and UK economies was materially different compared with prior to the onset of the pandemic, including elevated levels of consumer price inflation”. It also noted the possibility that renewed social distancing would boost demand for goods again, (as demand for services would fall), meaning “global price pressures might persist for longer”. (Recent news is that the largest port in the world in China has come down with an Omicron outbreak which is not only affecting the port but also factories in the region.)
- 13 On top of that, there were no references this month to inflation being expected to be below the **2% target in two years’ time**, which at November’s meeting the MPC referenced to suggest the markets had gone too far in expecting interest rates to rise to over 1.00% by the end of the year.
- 14 These comments indicate that there has been a material reappraisal by the MPC of the inflationary pressures since their last meeting and the Bank also increased its forecast for inflation to peak at 6% next April, rather than at 5% as of a month ago. However, as the Bank retained its guidance that only a “**modest tightening**” in policy will be required, it cannot be thinking that it will need to increase interest rates that much more. A typical policy tightening cycle has usually involved rates rising by 0.25% four times in a year. “Modest” seems slower than that. As such, the Bank could be thinking about raising interest rates two or three times next year to 0.75% or 1.00%.
- 15 In as much as a considerable part of the inflationary pressures at the current time are indeed **transitory**, and will naturally subside, and since economic growth is likely to be weak over the next few months, this would appear to indicate that this tightening cycle is likely to be comparatively short.
- 16 As for the timing of the next increase in Bank Rate, the MPC dropped the comment from November’s statement that Bank Rate would be raised “in the coming months”. That may imply another rise is unlikely at the next meeting in February and that May is more likely. However, much could depend on how adversely, or not, the economy is affected by Omicron in the run up to the next meeting on 3rd February. Once 0.50% is reached, the Bank would act to start shrinking its stock of QE, (gilts purchased by the Bank would not be replaced when they mature).
- 17 **US.** Shortages of goods and intermediate goods like semi-conductors, have been fuelling increases in prices and reducing economic growth potential. In November, **CPI inflation hit a near 40-year record level of 6.8%** but with energy prices then falling sharply, this is probably the peak. The biggest problem for the Fed is the mounting evidence of a strong pick-up in cyclical price pressures e.g., in rent which has hit a decades high.

- 18 **Shortages of labour** have also been driving up wage rates sharply; this also poses a considerable threat to feeding back into producer prices and then into consumer prices inflation. It now also appears that there has been a sustained drop in the labour force which suggests the pandemic has had a longer-term scarring effect in reducing potential GDP. Economic growth may therefore be reduced to between 2 and 3% in 2022 and 2023 while core inflation is likely to remain elevated at around 3% in both years instead of declining back to the Fed's 2% central target.
- 19 Inflation hitting 6.8% and the feed through into second round effects, meant that it was near certain that the **Fed's meeting of 15th December** would take aggressive action against inflation. Accordingly, the rate of tapering of monthly \$120bn QE purchases announced at its November 3rd meeting. was doubled so that all purchases would now finish in February 2022. In addition, Fed officials had started discussions on running down the stock of QE held by the Fed. Fed officials also expected three rate rises in 2022 of 0.25% from near zero currently, followed by three in 2023 and two in 2024, taking rates back above 2% to a neutral level for monetary policy. The first increase could come as soon as March 2022 as the chairman of the Fed stated his view that the economy had made rapid progress to achieving the other goal of the Fed – “maximum employment”. The Fed forecast that inflation would fall from an average of 5.3% in 2021 to 2.6% in 2023, still above its target of 2% and both figures significantly up from previous forecasts. What was also significant was that this month the Fed dropped its description of the current level of inflation as being “transitory” and instead referred to “elevated levels” of inflation: the statement also dropped most of the language around the flexible average inflation target, with inflation now described as having exceeded 2 percent “for some time”. It did not see Omicron as being a major impediment to the need to take action now to curtail the level of inflationary pressures that have built up, although Fed officials did note that it has the potential to exacerbate supply chain problems and add to price pressures.
- 20 **EU.** The slow roll out of vaccines initially delayed **economic recovery** in early 2021 but the vaccination rate then picked up sharply. After a contraction of -0.3% in Q1, Q2 came in with strong growth of 2%. With Q3 at 2.2%, the EU recovery was then within 0.5% of its pre Covid size. However, the arrival of Omicron is now a major headwind to growth in quarter 4 and the expected downturn into weak growth could well turn negative, with the outlook for the first two months of 2022 expected to continue to be very weak.
- 21 **November's inflation figures** breakdown shows that the increase in price pressures is not just due to high energy costs and global demand-supply imbalances for durable goods as services inflation also rose. Headline inflation reached 4.9% in November, with over half of that due to energy. However, oil and gas prices are expected to fall after the winter and so energy inflation is expected to plummet in 2022. Core goods inflation rose to 2.4% in November, its second highest ever level, and is likely to remain high for some time as it will take a long time for the inflationary impact of global imbalances in the demand and supply of durable goods to disappear. Price pressures also increased in the services sector, but wage growth

remains subdued and there are no signs of a trend of faster wage growth which might lead to *persistently* higher services inflation - which would get the ECB concerned. The upshot is that the euro-zone is set for a prolonged period of inflation being above the ECB's target of 2% and it is likely to average 3% in 2022, in line with the ECB's latest projection

- 22 **ECB tapering.** The ECB has joined with the Fed by also announcing at its meeting on 16th December that it will be reducing its QE purchases - by half from October 2022, i.e., it will still be providing significant stimulus via QE purchases for over half of next year. However, as inflation will fall back sharply during 2022, it is likely that it will leave its central rate below zero, (currently -0.50%), over the next two years. The main struggle that the ECB has had in recent years is that inflation has been doggedly anaemic in sticking below the ECB's target rate despite all its major programmes of monetary easing by cutting rates into negative territory and providing QE support
- 23 The ECB will now also need to consider the impact of **Omicron** on the economy, and it stated at its December meeting that it is prepared to provide further QE support if the pandemic causes bond yield spreads of peripheral countries, (compared to the yields of northern EU countries), to rise. However, that is the only reason it will support peripheral yields, so this support is limited in its scope
- 24 The EU has entered a **period of political uncertainty** where a new German government formed of a coalition of three parties with Olaf Scholz replacing Angela Merkel as Chancellor in December 2021, will need to find its feet both within the EU and in the three parties successfully working together. In France there is a presidential election coming up in April 2022 followed by the legislative election in June. In addition, Italy needs to elect a new president in January with Prime Minister Draghi being a favourite due to having suitable gravitas for this post. However, if he switched office, there is a significant risk that the current government coalition could collapse. That could then cause differentials between Italian and German bonds to widen when 2022 will also see a gradual running down of ECB support for the bonds of weaker countries within the EU. These political uncertainties could have repercussions on economies and on Brexit.
- 25 **China.** After a concerted effort to get on top of the virus outbreak in Q1 2020, economic recovery was strong in the rest of **2020**; this enabled China to recover all the initial contraction. During 2020, policy makers both quashed the virus and implemented a programme of monetary and fiscal support that was particularly effective at stimulating short-term growth. At the same time, China's economy benefited from the shift towards online spending by consumers in developed markets. These factors helped to explain its comparative outperformance compared to western economies during 2020 and earlier in 2021
- 26 However, the pace of economic growth has now fallen back in **2021** after this initial surge of recovery from the pandemic and looks likely to be particularly weak in 2022. China has been struggling to contain the spread of the Delta

variant through using sharp local lockdowns - which depress economic growth. Chinese consumers are also being very wary about leaving home and so spending money on services. However, with Omicron having now spread to China, and being much more easily transmissible, this strategy of sharp local lockdowns to stop the virus may not prove so successful in future. In addition, the current pace of providing boosters at 100 billion per month will leave much of the 1.4 billion population exposed to Omicron, and any further mutations, for a considerable time. The **People's Bank of China** made a start in December 2021 on cutting its key interest rate marginally so as to stimulate economic growth. However, after credit has already expanded by around 25% in just the last two years, it will probably leave the heavy lifting in supporting growth to fiscal stimulus by central and local government.

- 27 Supply shortages, especially of coal for power generation, were causing widespread power cuts to industry during the second half of 2021 and so a sharp disruptive impact on some sectors of the economy. In addition, recent regulatory actions motivated by a political agenda to channel activities into officially approved directions, are also likely to reduce the dynamism and long-term growth of the Chinese economy
- 28 **Japan.** 2021 has been a patchy year in combating Covid. However, recent business surveys indicate that the economy has been rebounding rapidly in 2021 once the bulk of the population had been double vaccinated and new virus cases had plunged. However, Omicron could reverse this initial success in combating Covid.
- 29 The Bank of Japan is continuing its **very loose monetary policy** but with little prospect of getting inflation back above 1% towards its target of 2%, any time soon: indeed, inflation was negative in July. New Prime Minister Kishida, having won the November general election, brought in a supplementary budget to boost growth, but it is unlikely to have a major effect.
- 30 **World growth.** World growth was in recession in 2020 but recovered during 2021 until starting to lose momentum in the second half of the year, though overall growth for the year is expected to be about 6% and to be around 4-5% in 2022. Inflation has been rising due to increases in gas and electricity prices, shipping costs and supply shortages, although these should subside during 2022. While headline inflation will fall sharply, core inflation will probably not fall as quickly as central bankers would hope. It is likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a **reversal of world globalisation** and a decoupling of western countries from dependence on China to supply products, and vice versa. This is likely to reduce world growth rates from those in prior decades.
- 31 **Supply shortages.** The pandemic and extreme weather events, followed by a major surge in demand after lockdowns ended, have been highly disruptive of extended worldwide supply chains. Major queues of ships unable to unload their goods at ports in New York, California and China built up rapidly during quarters 2 and 3 of 2021 but then halved during quarter 4. Such issues have led to a misdistribution of shipping containers around the world and have

contributed to a huge increase in the cost of shipping. Combined with a shortage of semi-conductors, these issues have had a disruptive impact on production in many countries. The latest additional disruption has been a shortage of coal in China leading to power cuts focused primarily on producers (rather than consumers), i.e., this will further aggravate shortages in meeting demand for goods. Many western countries are also hitting up against a difficulty in filling job vacancies. It is expected that these issues will be gradually sorted out, but they are currently contributing to a spike upwards in inflation and shortages of materials and goods available to purchase.

Summary

- 32 In the December 2021 meeting, The Monetary Policy Committee voted by a majority of 8-1 to increase the interest rate to 0.25%. The action was taken as inflation continues to climb and expected to peak in April at 6%. The MPC have also indicated that further bank rate increases are likely in 2022. However, this could depend on how adversely, or not, the economy is affected by Omicron. Once 0.50% is reached, the Bank would act to start shrinking its stock of QE.**
- 33 There is a question of whether any further mutations of this virus could develop which render all current vaccines ineffective, as opposed to how quickly vaccines can be modified to deal with them and enhanced testing programmes be implemented to contain their spread until tweaked vaccines become widely available the impact of which may stagger the economic recovery.**

Link Asset Services
01 December 2021

Appendix 5 Credit and counterparty risk management (TMP1)

All specified and non-specified Investments will be:

Subject to the sovereign, counterparty and group exposure limits identified in the Annual Investment Strategy (Section 10).

Subject to the duration limit **where applicable** suggested by Link (+6 months for UK institutions) at the time each investment is placed.

Subject to a maximum of 60% of funds being held in non-specified investments at any one time.

Sterling denominated.

Specified Investments (maturities up to 1 year):

investment	Minimum Credit Criteria
UK Debt Management Agency Deposit Facility	UK Sovereign A-
Term deposits - UK local authorities	UK Sovereign A-
Term deposits - UK nationalised banks	UK Sovereign A- Counterparty BBB, F2 or Green excluding CDS
Term deposits – all other banks and building societies	UK Sovereign A- / Non-UK Sovereign AA- Counterparty A-, F1 or Green excluding CDS
Certificates of deposit - UK nationalised banks	UK Sovereign A- Counterparty BBB, F2 or Green excluding CDS
Certificates of deposit – all other banks and building societies	UK Sovereign A- / Non-UK Sovereign AA- Counterparty A-, F1, or Green excluding CDS
UK Treasury Bills	UK Sovereign A-
UK Government Gilts	UK Sovereign A-
Bonds issued by multi-lateral development banks	AAA
Sovereign bond issues (other than the UK Gov't)	AAA
Money market funds (CNAV, LVNAV or VNAV)	AAA
Enhanced cash / Government liquidity / Ultra-short dated bond funds	AA

Non-specified Investments (maturities in excess of 1 year and any maturity if not included above):

Investment	Minimum Credit Criteria	Max duration to maturity
Fixed term deposits with variable rate and variable maturities (structured deposits) - UK nationalised banks	UK Sovereign A- Counterparty BBB,F2 (Green)	2 years
Fixed term deposits with variable rate and variable maturities (structured deposits) - banks and building societies	UK sovereign A- / Non-UK Sovereign AA- Counterparty A-, F1 (Green)	2 years
Term deposits - local authorities	UK Sovereign A-	3 years
Term deposits - UK nationalised banks	UK Sovereign A- Counterparty BBB,F2 (Green)	2 years
Term deposits - banks, building societies	UK Sovereign A- / Non-UK Sovereign AA- Counterparty A-, F1 (Green)	2 years
<i>Term deposits – housing associations</i>	<i>UK Sovereign A- Counterparty A-</i>	<i>2 years</i>
Certificates of deposit - UK nationalised banks	UK Sovereign A- Counterparty BBB,F2 (Green)	2 years
Certificates of deposit - banks and building societies	UK Sovereign A- / Non-UK Sovereign AA- Counterparty A-, F1 (Green)	2 years
Commercial paper - UK nationalised banks	UK Sovereign A- Counterparty BBB,F2 (Green)	2 years
Commercial paper - banks and building societies	UK Sovereign A- / Non-UK Sovereign AA- Counterparty A-, F1 (Green)	2 years
Floating rate notes issued by multilateral development banks	AAA	2 years
Bonds issued by multilateral development banks	AAA	2 years
Sovereign bonds (other than the UK Government)	AAA	2 years
UK Government Gilts	UK Sovereign A-	5 years
Property funds	N/A	N/A
Diversified income <i>and or short dated bond</i> funds	N/A	N/A

Accounting treatment of investments. The accounting treatment may differ from the underlying cash transactions arising from investment decisions made. To ensure that the Council is protected from any adverse revenue impact, which may arise from these differences, we will review the accounting implications of new transactions before they are undertaken.

Appendix 6 Approved countries for investments

Each financial institution must meet the minimum credit criteria specified in the Annual Investment Strategy (Section 10). For non-UK regulated institutions the institutions sovereign must be rated AA- or higher by each of the three rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's.

This list will be reviewed and amended if appropriate on a weekly basis by the Director of Finance and Transformation.

As of 31 December 2021 sovereigns meeting the above requirement which also (except for Hong Kong, Norway and Luxembourg) have banks operating in sterling markets with credit ratings of green or above on the Link Asset Services' Credit Worthiness List were:

AAA	Australia Denmark Germany Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Singapore Sweden Switzerland
AA+	Canada Finland USA
AA	Abu Dhabi (UAE) France
AA-	Belgium Hong Kong Qatar

At 31 December 2021 the UK received a credit rating of AA- from Fitch and Moody's and AA from Standard and Poor's.